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Abstract: This paper challenges the conventional wisdom that the 1960s conglomerates were
inefficient. I offer valuation results consistent with recent event-study evidence that markets
typically rewarded diversifying acquisitions. Using new data, I compute industry-adjusted
valuation, profitability, leverage, and investment ratios for thirty-six large, acquisitive
conglomerates from 1966 to 1974. During the early 1970s, the conglomerates were less valuable
and less profitable than standalone firms, favoring an agency explanation for unrelated
diversification. In the 1960s, however, conglomerates were not valued at a discount. Evidence
from acquisition histories suggests that conglomerate diversification may have added value by
creating internal capital markets.
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1. Introduction
Corporate restructuring in the 1980s has generally been seen as an “undoing” of the earlier,
conglomerate merger wave of the 1960s and early 1970s. In the consensus view, the last thirty
years have been a “round trip of the American corporation” (Shleifer and Vishny, 1991), a trip
from specialization to conglomeration and back to specialization or “focus.” This view is based
partly on evidence from studies of the conglomerate period by Rumelt (1974, 1982), Ravenscraft
and Scherer (1987), Kaplan and Weisbach (1992), and others who find no evidence that
conglomerate diversification improved long-term firm performance. Combined with findings of
negative market valuations for diversified firms and diversifying acquisitions during the 1980s
(Bhagat, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1990; Lang and Stulz, 1994; Berger and Ofek, 1995; Comment
and Jarrell, 1995), the evidence has led to the conclusion that unrelated diversification is per se
inefficient, and that the conglomerate era is best understood as an agency phenomenon.
Recent findings question this conventional wisdom, however. Matsusaka (1993a) and
Hubbard and Palia (1999) provide event-study evidence that diversifying acquisitions were
value-increasing during the conglomerate period. In light of the newer evidence, “[t]he simple
view that the 1980s ‘bust-ups’ were a corrective to past managerial excesses is untenable”
(Matsusaka, 1993a). Moreover, major U.S. corporations continue to be diversified. Montgomery
(1994) reports that for each of the years 1985, 1989, and 1992, over two-thirds of the Fortune 500
companies were active in at least five distinct lines of business (defined by 4-digit Standard
Industrial Classification codes). As she reminds us, “While the popular press and some research-
ers have highlighted recent divestiture activity among [the largest U.S.] firms, claiming a ‘return     
1 Several recent studies also question the claim that diversification destroyed value in the 1980s and 1990s.
Maksimovic and Phillips (forthcoming) argue that comparative advantage, rather than agency costs or financial-
market imperfections, explains why diversified firms appear to trade at a discount. Chevalier (1999), Graham,
Lemmon, and Wolf (forthcoming), and Campa and Kedia (2000) show that selection effects, rather than value
destruction, explain much of the observed discount.
     
2 But see Matsusaka (1996) for the case that antitrust enforcement did not play a major role in the diversification
of the 1960s. In a sample of 549 acquisitions from 1968, he found that diversification was equally likely when small
firms merged as when large firms merged, even though only large firms would have been subject to antitrust
scrutiny.
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to the core,’ some changes at the margin must not obscure the fact that these firms remain
remarkably diversified.”
1
Another problem with the agency view of the 1960s is that it is based largely on ex post
evidence. Studies such as Ravenscraft and Scherer’s (1987) look at the long-term, post-merger
performance of merging firms, or the value added from the breakups of the 1980s (and by
implication, of the value lost from the conglomerations of the 1960s). This evidence does not
control, however, for the competitive, regulatory, and institutional changes of the last 30 or 40
years, changes that likely affect the relative efficiency of diversification. Capital markets have
become more competitive, specialized management and personnel consultants have replaced
some internal management and control systems, and antitrust authorities have taken a more
relaxed attitude toward horizontal and vertical (as opposed to conglomerate) expansion.
2 If these
changes are exogenous, then the relative value of conglomerate firms will have changed over
time—whatever the efficiency properties of diversification in general.
Can the placing of various diverse business units within a single ownership structure create
value? One theory is that the subunits can benefit from the creation of an internal capital market
within the conglomerate. Alchian (1969), Williamson (1975), Gertner, Scharfstein, and Stein
(1994), and Stein (1997) argue that internal capital markets have advantages where access to
external funds is limited. The central office of the diversified firm can use informational
advantages, residual control rights, and its ability to intervene selectively in divisional affairs to     
3 This literature includes Matsusaka (1993a, 1993b, forthcoming); Barber, Palmer, and Wallace (1995); Servaes
(1996); and Hubbard and Palia (1999).
3
allocate resources within the firm better than the external capital markets would do if the
divisions were standalone firms. However, rent seeking by divisional managers (Scharfstein and
Stein, 2000), bargaining problems within the firm (Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales, 2000) or
bureaucratic rigidity (Shin and Stulz, 1998) can make divisional cross-subsidization inefficient.
The present paper contributes to a growing empirical literature that examines the costs and
benefits of diversification by reevaluating the evidence from the conglomerate period itself.
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However, unlike most other studies, which look at broad samples of diversified and
nondiversified firms, I focus on a narrowly defined sample of large, highly diversified conglom-
erates, the firms in which internal-capital-market advantages are most likely to be realized. My
sample—a panel of thirty-six “acquisitive” conglomerates from 1966 to 1974, the height of the
conglomerate merger wave—contains more detailed business-segment information than that
available to previous researchers. Using these line-of-business data, for each firm in each year of
the sample I construct a benchmark portfolio of assets, distributed across lines of business in the
same proportions as the conglomerate. This matched portfolio is composed of shares of
nondiversified firms whose main industries match those of each conglomerate division (and are
similar in size). The shares are weighted to correspond to the conglomerate’s distribution of
activity in each line of business. By subtracting from each conglomerate’s value or profit a
weighted average of the values or profits of its matching standalone firms, I measure the value
added by firm-level diversification, controlling for industry and scale effects.
My results challenge the idea that conglomeration is per se inefficient. Specifically. I find an
average “diversification discount” of 0.07 and a median discount of 0.08 for the 1966–74 period,
much smaller than the discounts reported by Lang and Stulz (1994) and Berger and Ofek (1995)
for the 1980s. Moreover, the discount changes substantially over time. For the middle years of4
the sample, 1969 to 1971, I find an average discount of 0.18 and a median discount of 0.11. For
the latest years, 1972 to 1974, the average discount is slightly higher, 0.20, while the median
discount falls to 0.04. During the earliest years of the sample, 1966 to 1968, I find an average
diversification “premium” of 0.27, and a median discount of 0.08, though neither the premium
nor the discount is statistically significantly different from zero. In other words, while large,
acquisitive conglomerates tended to perform more poorly than their matched portfolio
benchmarks during the end of the 1960s and the early 1970s, many conglomerates performed
very well during the middle and late 1960s, and conglomerates as a group were not valued at a
discount. When I control for unobserved firm-specific characteristics and other known determi-
nants of firm value such as operating efficiency and leverage, the average 1966–68 premium rises
to 0.36 (and becomes statistically significant), the average 1969–71 discount falls to 0.01 (no
longer statistically significant), and the average 1972–74 discount falls to 0.17 (still statistically
significant). This suggests that conglomeration may have added value during the late 1960s, but
reduced value during the early 1970s.
What could explain such a valuation premium? Further analysis suggests that the valuation
and profitability results reflect the changing efficiency of internal capital markets. Following
Hubbard and Palia (1999), I construct measures of external financing constraints for my sample
conglomerates and their acquisition targets. Hubbard and Palia find that the highest abnormal
bidder returns in diversifying acquisitions during the 1960s came when financially unconstrained
firms acquired firms that faced costly external financing (or vice versa). This implies that market
participants expected diversifying acquisitions to create value by providing opportunities by
creating internal capital markets. Using a similar approach, I show that those of my sample
conglomerates that made internal-capital-market generating acquisitions were rewarded with
higher industry-adjusted q and profitability ratios than those conglomerates that made other kinds     
4 Matsusaka (forthcoming) also uses the Weston–Mansinghka list.
     
5 Compustat began collecting business-segment information only in 1974, while Trinet’s Large Establishment
Data Base, compiled from plant-level census data, starts in 1979. The Federal Trade Commission’s line-of-business
project collected business-segment data from 1974 to 1977. Dun and Bradstreet’s Million Dollar Directory provides
SIC codes, but no other information, for business segments as early as the 1950s. Most papers on diversification use
the Compustat data; Wernerfelt and Montgomery (1988), Lichtenberg (1992), and Liebeskind and Opler (1995) use
the census data. Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987) use the FTC data, while Servaes (1996) and Matsusaka (forthcom-
ing) get segment information from the Million Dollar Directory.
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of acquisitions. Moreover, the valuation premium for firms with internal capital markets is
highest during the 1966–68 period, when the average conglomerate was not valued at a discount. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the sample, data, and
methods. Basic results are presented in section 3. Section 4 explains the analysis of internal-
capital-market advantages based on acquisitions and external financing constraints. Section 5
concludes.
2. Data and methods
To construct the dataset I begin with the 63 firms used in Weston and Mansinghka’s (1971)
pioneering study of conglomerates.
4 This list consists of all firms making at least three mergers
during the 1960–68 period and meeting the following conditions: (1) at least 20% of the increase
in the firm’s total assets during the period must be from external acquisitions, and (2) in 1968 the
firm must be active in at least ten 3-digit SIC categories or at least five 2-digit SIC categories.
For each firm on the Weston–Mansinghka list, I hand-collected business-segment information
from annual reports, SEC form 10-Ks, and standard reference sources such as Moody’s Industrial
Manual.
5 These sources provide descriptions of the firms’ product lines and some measure of
activity by industry segment, most often segment sales. Assets, income, or capital expenditures
by industry segment were almost never reported. (Indeed, firms were generally reluctant to     
6 Some segments changed their reported activities from year to year, in which case I adjusted the segment SIC
codes accordingly.
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release any line-of-business information until it became required on the form 10-K.) Based on
product descriptions I assigned a 4-digit SIC code to each segment in each year.
6 Using these
sources, I could find reliable segment information for 36 of the Weston–Mansinghka firms. This
left a sample of 36 conglomerates with sales-weighted segment information, a richer dataset than
that those used for previous studies of this period. A list of these firms is provided in  Table 1.
[Table 1 about here]
Table 2 provides some descriptive statistics for the sample. Panel A gives average and
median sales, assets, and earnings (EBIT) for the sample conglomerates and for all manufactur-
ing firms (defined as all firms in the NBER Master File; see Hall, 1990, for a description).
Clearly, these conglomerates were large firms—much larger, on average, than the typical firm.
The sample firms average, for the 1966–74 period, $1,393.4 million in assets and $1,546.9
million in annual sales, compared with $306.2 million and $340.7 million, respectively, for all
manufacturing firms. Yet these conglomerates were not the largest firms in the economy. The
largest firms, even during the conglomerate boom years, were AT&T, the oil companies, General
Motors, Ford, and other industrial giants that diversified only narrowly. (Tenneco, for example,
the largest conglomerate in my sample, was about one-seventh the size of Exxon.)
Panel B of Table 2 gives information on the conglomerates’ levels of diversification, first by
the number of industry segments per observation, and second by segment sales–weighted
Herfindahl indexes (as in Comment and Jarrell, 1995, and Lang and Stulz, 1994). The average
number of segments per firm-year is 5.1, with a minimum of two and a maximum of ten. The
Herfindahls are calculated, for each firm-year, as the sum of squared segment sales divided by
total sales. A four-segment firm with one large segment and three small segments has a larger     
7 The adjustment for age structure is as described in Hall, 1990.
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Herfindahl than a firm with four equally sized segments; hence the segment Herfindahl provides
a more precise measure of diversification than simply reporting the number of segments. The
Herfindahls vary from a minimum of 0.11 to a maximum of 0.70, indicating considerable variety
in these firms’ diversification strategies. Admittedly, these industry segments are coarser than
true lines of business; nonetheless they provide reasonable approximations of actual business
activities. 
[Table 2 about here]
These figures highlight a key difference between my sample firms and those that make up
Servaes’s (1996) sample of diversification in the 1960s and 1970s. Servaes uses a broad sample
of multiple-segment and single-segment firms. His firms are less diversified than mine, with an
average of 1.5–2.3 segments per firm from 1967 to 1973, compared with my 5.0 segments per
firm. His firms are also smaller than mine, with average assets of $274–389 million, close to the
average for all manufacturing firms. Servaes’s paper is about diversification per se, while mine
focuses on a particular set of diversified firms, namely large, acquisitive conglomerates.  Also,
Servaes’s segment data are from Dun and Bradstreet’s Million Dollar Directory. The Million
Dollar Directory segment codes are similar to my segment codes, so this apparent difference in
the average degree of diversification between the two samples is probably not an artifact of the
different coding schemes. 
From the NBER Master File I then retrieved data for Tobin’s q, operating profit, cash flow,
leverage, and investment for each conglomerate. Tobin’s q is computed as the market value of
common and preferred stock plus the book value of short- and long-term debt, adjusted for age
structure, less the net short-term assets, all divided by the book value of capital stock.
7 Because
firms with low q ratios have low expected cash flows relative to the amount of invested capital, q8
can be interpreted as a measure of the firm’s investment opportunity set (Smith and Watts, 1992;
Gaver and Gaver, 1993), or as a measure of managerial inefficiency or agency conflict within the
firm (Lang, Stulz, and Walkling, 1991). Operating profit (operating income divided by total
assets) is used to measure the efficiency of the firm’s operating units, independent of the firm’s
capital structure, investment policy, and other variables that are part of the firm’s corporate-level
strategy. Cash flow is measured as income available for common plus depreciation less income
taxes paid, all divided by net sales. Leverage is defined as the value of long-term debt, adjusted
for age structure, divided by total assets, and investment is defined as gross investment divided
by total assets.
Table 3 reports unadjusted value and performance measures for the full, nine-year panel and
three 3-year subperiods. As seen in the table, the average value of large, acquisitive conglomer-
ates was declining throughout the sample period. The sample firms have an average q of 2.03
during the 1966–68 subperiod (the peak of the conglomerate “boom”), 1.24 during the 1969–71
subperiod, and 0.94 during the 1972–74 subperiod. Median q declines similarly from 1.50 to 1.12
to 0.90. Operating profit and cash flow remained roughly constant, while leverage increased
slightly and investment declined.
[Table 3 about here]
Are these patterns caused by diversification? One way to assess the effect of diversification
on value would be to compare conglomerates to specialized firms. However, if the divisions of a
conglomerate are systematically located in high-q industries, or systematically operate at a more
efficient scale, then this comparison would suggest that diversification adds value although the
positive relation between diversification and value has nothing to do with diversification itself.
To address this problem, I compare the characteristics of the sample conglomerates with the
characteristics they would have if each division were like the median standalone firm in the same     
8 I excluded financial segments (SIC 6000–6999) and segments for regulated utilities (SIC 4900 and SIC 4999).
     
9 The standard deviation was 4.3 matching firms per segment-year, with a minimum of 1 and a maximum of 21.
The NBER Master File excludes many non-manufacturing firms, so the segments that failed to match were typically
non-manufacturing segments or very small segments. 
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industry and about the same size. This comparison assesses the benefits of diversification within
the conglomerate structure independent of the benefits of industry diversification per se. 
I construct industry-adjusted values of q, operating profit, cash flow, leverage, and invest-
ment using the following procedure. The sample of 36 firms provides 283 conglomerate
observations with a total of 1,442 business-segment observations.
8 For each segment-year I
searched for matching firms from the set of all firms in the NBER Master File meeting two
criteria: (1) they are classified by Compustat as having in that year the same primary 3-digit SIC
code as the conglomerate’s segment, and (2) they have sales of  at least 50%, and no more than
150%, of the sales of the conglomerate segment. The sales restriction, besides controlling for
scale, also controls for the possibility that the matching firms are themselves diversified; to the
extent that firm size proxies for diversification, the matching firms are no more diversified than
their corresponding conglomerate segments. Using these criteria I identified, on average, 5.02
matching firms per segment-year, and was able to match 1,042 of the 1,442 segment-years in the
sample (72%).
9
I also experimented with variations in the matching criteria, exploring the tradeoff between
the “tightness” of the scale criterion and the ability to generate a reasonably large set of matching
firms. The results are not particularly sensitive to small changes in the size criterion. Abandoning
the size criterion altogether, however, makes industry-adjusted conglomerate performance worse
for the early years of the sample and better for the later years. This suggests that scale effects are
important in adjusting value or profit measures for industry effects. (See also the discussion of
Servaes, 1996, below.)10
I then retrieved the median values of q and the other financial ratios for the firms matching
each segment-year, and constructed sales-weighted averages of those variables for each firm in
each year. The final dataset contains exactly parallel samples of 283 conglomerate observations
and 283 matching sets of standalone firms, matched at the divisional level by year, size, and
industry. 
The matched standalone observations are then subtracted from the conglomerate observations
to provide industry-adjusted figures for each performance variable. That is, suppose that in a
given year conglomerate i has total sales Xi, segments j = 1, ... , n, and segment sales xi
j. For a









where Ri is the conglomerate’s own R, ri




«Xi is the weight assigned to division j. Industry-adjusted q, for example, can be interpreted
as the difference between the conglomerate’s own q and the q it would have most likely had if
each of its divisions were as valuable as the median standalone firm in the same industry and
about the same size.
3. Results
3.1.  Basic results
Table 4 reports industry-adjusted value and performance measures. Panel A provides average
and median industry-adjusted values of q, operating profit, cash flow, leverage, and investment
for the full sample and the three-year subperiods. For the full, 1966–74 period the conglomerates     
10 Weston and Mansinghka (1971) and Melicher and Rush (1973) also found that conglomerates were highly
leveraged. Weston (1981) suggests that conglomerate acquirers specifically sought targets whose debt capacity had
not been fully utilized.
     
11 The statistical significance of the industry-adjusted values reported in Table 4 is potentially overstated because
the same firm is included several times in each subperiod. I correct for this in the regression models reported below,
and the significance levels are the same.
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have negative industry-adjusted q ratios and operating profit margins, and positive industry-
adjusted leverage ratios. The industry-adjusted q ratios correspond to an average diversification
discount of 0.07 and a median discount of 0.08. During this period the conglomerates were less
valuable, less profitable, and more highly leveraged than size-weighted groups of nondiversified
firms from the same industries.
10 (Industry-adjusted cash flow and investment values are
essentially zero). Consistent with Servaes (1996), there is a negative relationship between
diversification and value, though the discount is small.
[Table 4 about here]
The results vary widely among the three subperiods. Average industry-adjusted q is 0.27 for
the first subperiod (not significantly different from zero), !0.18 for the second (significant at the
5% level), and !0.20 for the third (significant at the 1% level). In other words, there is a
diversification premium from 1966 to 1968 and a moderate discount from 1969 to 1971 and from
1972 to 1974. Median industry-adjusted q is !0.08 for the first subperiod (not significantly
different from zero), !0.11 for the second (significant at the 1% level), and !0.04 for the third
(significant at the 1% level). The divergence between average and median industry-adjusted q for
the 1966–68 subperiod implies that the distribution of q during this subperiod is highly skewed;
conglomerate performance was more volatile during this period than during the other periods.
Industry-adjusted operating profit, cash flow, leverage, and investment do not change substan-
tially across subperiods. In short, despite low current profitability and high leverage, adjusted for
industry, investors did not discount conglomerate stocks as a group prior to 1969.
1112
Do these results reflect the value of diversification per se, or only large, acquisitive conglom-
erates? Servaes (1996) studies single- and multiple-segment firms from the same period and
finds a different result: multiple-segment firms were valued at a substantial discount compared to
single-segment firms during the 1960s, but not during the early 1970s. This suggests that my
result holds only for large, acquisitive conglomerates and not for diversified firms more
generally.
To see how my sample of acquisitive conglomerates compares to Servaes’s sample I
computed industry-adjusted q ratios for my sample firms using the same procedure Servaes used
to compute his Table III. Servaes’s sample includes less detailed segment information, so he
could not control for scale in constructing industry-adjusted q ratios, nor construct activity-
weighted averages. Imitating his procedure, I adjusted the q ratios for my sample firms by two
methods, first using the firm’s primary industry only, and second using an equally weighted
average of all the firm’s industries. I also did not control for scale in selecting the matching
firms. Table 5 summarizes the results. Servaes reports average industry-adjusted q ratios for his
multiple-segment firms of !0.77 for 1967, !0.60 for 1970, and !0.08 for 1973 using the first
method, and !0.64 for 1967, !0.53 for 1970, and !0.06 for 1973 using the second (his data are
cross-sectional, collected every three years). Using his procedure, I estimated for my firms
average industry-adjusted q ratios of 0.08 for 1966–68, !0.14 for 1969–71, and !0.08 for
1972–74 using the first method, and 0.02 for 1966–68, !0.17 for 1969–71, and !0.08 for
1972–74 using the second (I use a three-year average rather than a single year, since my sample is
smaller). That is, my large, acquisitive conglomerates were valued much more highly than the
average diversified firm during the early period, about the same during the middle period, and
less highly during the later period. Looking at the medians rather than the means, the results are
similar: my conglomerates were valued much more highly (that is, discounted much less
severely) than the average diversified firm during the early period, somewhat more highly during     
12 Innovation rents, the returns from being the first to develop a new product, process, or organizational form, are
featured prominently in recent models of endogenous innovation (Aghion and Howitt, 1992; Grossman and
Helpman, 1991; Romer, 1990).
     
13 The subperiod difference tests are analogous to the “differences-in-differences” tests used in the literature on
natural experiments (Meyer, 1995, and Heckman and Smith, 1995).
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the middle period, and about the same during the later period. Over this period the performance
of large, acquisitive conglomerates was much more volatile than the performance of diversified
firms more generally.
[Table 5 about here]
One possible explanation for these results is that the firms in my sample were the first to
develop the conglomerate form during the early and middle 1960s and were earning “innovation
rents” as late as the 1966–68 period.
12 As the innovation was diffused, those rents were dissi-
pated, disappearing by the late 1960s and early 1970s. Moreover, Table 5 demonstrates that
industry-adjusted values can vary substantially depending on the weighting and sampling
procedure. By using segment data without weights, Servaes (1996) could expand his sample to a
broad set of diversified and nondiviersified firms, but at the cost of less precise estimates of
industry-adjusted values. Specifically, comparison of Panels B and C of Table 5 suggests that
Servaes’s method of assigning equal segment weights can bias downward the estimates of
industry-adjusted q, relative to the procedure of using correct segment weights. This may explain
part of the difference in our results. 
Panel B of Table 4 reports the change in industry-adjusted q between the subperiods.
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Between the first and second subperiods, average industry-adjusted q falls from 0.27 to !0.18, a
difference of !0.45 (significant at the 5% level). Between the second and third subperiods,
average industry-adjusted q falls from !0.18 to !0.20. This shows that the measured differences
in industry-adjusted q between the first and second subperiods are not due to random error.14
Contrary to the conventional wisdom, the diversification discount was imposed on large,
acquisitive conglomerates only at the end of the 1960s.
3.2.  Sample selection issues
One concern with the results reported above is that the panel is unbalanced, as data were
unavailable for several firms in the sample during the earliest years. The entry of new firms in the
sample could bias the results for the earlier, 1966–68 subperiod. For example, average industry-
adjusted q would appear to decline after 1969 if the sample contained only firms with above-
average ratios for the earliest years, while firms with below-average industry-adjusted q ratios
were added over time.
To investigate this possibility I redid the comparisons for various subsets of firms in the
sample. First, I created a balanced panel including only the firms that were present in 1966.
Qualitatively, the results (not reported here) are similar to those presented in Table 4, with one
exception: the conglomerates now have negative average industry-adjusted q ratios for the
1966–68 subperiod (significant at the 5% level). Second, I did the same comparisons, over the
same three periods, including only the firms present in 1967. The qualitative results are now
virtually identical to those presented in Table 4 (the 1966–68 discount becomes a premium,
significant at the 10% level). This means that average conglomerate q rises, not falls, as firms
enter the sample in 1967. The entry of additional firms in 1968 and 1969 does not affect the
general result. In short, changes in the composition of the sample over time do not appear to be
driving the findings. On the other hand, the fact that the sign of the average discount switches
during the early period and is significant shows how difficult it is to estimate accurately the size
of the diversification discount using these data. 15
Another potential problem is that Weston and Mansinghka’s list of acquisitive conglomer-
ates, from which my sample is drawn, is composed of firms that were both highly diversified and
active acquirers during the 1960–68 period. But my analysis begins in 1966, before the
Weston–Mansinghka list is complete. If strongly performing firms tend to make acquisitions and
poorly performing firms do not, then my sample could be biased by the inclusion of firms that
did well during the 1966–68 subperiod, even if they did poorly from 1969 to 1974. According to
this line of reasoning, a firm that performed well from 1960 to 1968 could make acquisitions and
thus be eligible for the Weston–Mansinghka list, while a firm that performed poorly before 1968
but well afterward would not make enough acquisitions before 1968 to meet Weston and
Mansinghka’s growth criterion. This could account for the differences in my findings among the
three subperiods.
I do not think the sample is biased in this way, however, for two reasons. First, the underlying
hypothesis, that diversifying acquisitions follow strong performance, is inconsistent with the
existing empirical literature on conglomerates. Diversification is usually a response to poor
performance or low growth opportunities in their core business. Weston and Mansinghka’s 63
conglomerate firms, for example, tended to be poor performers before they became conglomer-
ates. Matsusaka (forthcoming) offers a model in which firms diversify because their original
businesses are not good matches with their organizational capabilities. He presents evidence on
changes in firms’ core businesses over time consistent with this model. There is thus no reason to
think the Weston–Mansinghka criteria systematically select above-average performers during the
1960–68 period. 
Second, even if the Weston–Mansinghka criteria did exclude firms that were below-average
performers in 1968, above-average performers from 1969 to 1972, and conglomerates after 1969,
there do not seem to be many such firms. To find firms with those characteristics, I computed q
ratios for all firms in the NBER Master file from 1960 to 1974. Of the 1,133 firms with usable16
data, 109 firms had below-average 1960–68 q ratios (which, by hypothesis, would exclude them
from making acquisitions and therefore being candidates for the Weston–Mansinghka list) and
above-average 1969–74 q ratios. Of those 109 firms, only about four were active in five or more
2-digit SIC categories (one of Weston and Mansinghka’s diversification criteria) in 1970, and
only about eight were active in five or more 2-digit SIC categories in 1973. Only three are in
Scharfstein’s (1998) list of 165 firms that were conglomerates in 1979. Thus it seems highly
unlikely that a poorly performing firm could fail to meet Weston and Mansinghka’s definition of
a conglomerate in 1968, then subsequently perform well and become a conglomerate, leading to
the spurious conclusion that the Weston–Mansinghka firms performed well from 1966 to 1968
and poorly from 1969 to 1974. There are simply too few candidate firms having those character-
istics.
3.3.  Regression-adjusted comparisons of firm value
Measures of firm value such as q depend on observable firm characteristics such as operating
efficiency, leverage, and investment. Because the matching procedure for calculating industry-
adjusted q ratios does not match by these characteristics, it is possible that the signs and
magnitudes of the industry-adjusted q ratios are driven by differences between the conglomerates
and the matching firms in profitability, leverage, and investment rather than agency costs or
access to internal capital markets. Indeed, as Table 4 reveals, the conglomerates and matching
firms do differ in operating profit, leverage, and, investment.
To explore this possibility, I pooled the conglomerates and matched portfolios into a single
panel and regressed q on operating profit, leverage, investment, and an indicator variable,
“conglomerate dummy,” that distinguishes between conglomerate and matched portfolio
observations. This checks for differences in q while controlling for other known determinants of17
firm value. The regressions include a fixed effect for each conglomerate–portfolio pair to control
for unobserved heterogeneity among the conglomerates and to explore the effects of within-pair
changes in the degree and type of diversification over time. I also included year-fixed effects to
control for changes in the economic environment over time. To control for the fact that the paired
observations are not independent within each cross section, I compute robust standard errors
(White, 1980) treating each conglomerate–portfolio pair, rather than each observation, as an
independent unit.
The results, presented in Table 6, largely confirm the results of Table 4. In the first, third,
fifth, and seventh columns, only the indicator variable and a constant are used as regressors; the
coefficients on the indicator variable thus correspond exactly to the industry-adjusted q ratios
reported in Table 4. The second, fourth, sixth, and eighth columns add operating profit and
leverage as additional regressors. Consistent with the literature, there is a positive relation
between profitability and value. (Leverage has no systematic effect on q, however.) For the
1966–68 subperiod industry-adjusted q increases from 0.27 to 0.36 (and becomes statistically
significant). For the 1969–71 subperiod it falls from !0.18 to –.12 (and becomes insignificant),
and for the 1972–74 subperiod it falls from !0.20 to !0.17 (still significant). In other words,
when differences in operating efficiency and leverage are taken into account, the average
diversification premium is larger for the first subperiod and the average diversification discount
smaller for the second two subperiods. Again, this is inconsistent with the claim that conglomera-
tion always destroys value.
[Table 6 about here]     
14 Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales (2000), Wulf (1999), Chevalier (1999), and Whited (forthcoming) also study the
efficiency of internal capital markets using similar techniques.
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4. The value of internal capital markets: evidence from acquisitions
The evidence presented so far suggests that large conglomerates performed reasonably well
before 1970, but poorly afterward. Can the results for the late 1960s be attributed to internal-
capital-market advantages? Lamont (1997), Shin and Stulz (1998), and Scharfstein (1998) study
the efficiency of internal capital markets by looking directly at the direction of cross-subsidiza-
tion within the firm. Shin and Stulz (1998), for example, show that diversified firms tend to
misallocate investment resources, failing to direct funds to divisions in industries with high
growth opportunities.
14 Unfortunately, this exercise requires data on income and capital expendi-
tures by segment; as discussed above, such data are unavailable for the 1960s and early 1970s.
Hubbard and Palia (1999) try an indirect approach instead, looking for acquisitions likely to have
created internal capital markets. Hubbard and Palia study 392 acquisitions from 1961 to 1970 and
classify each bidder and each target according to its access to external finance. If a financially
constrained bidder acquires an unconstrained target, or vice-versa, then the acquisition can create
value by giving the cash-constrained firm access to the other firm’s cash flows. Hubbard and
Palia report that diversifying acquisitions generally earned positive abnormal returns during this
period, and that the highest returns were generated when acquisitions created internal capital
markets in this fashion. This suggests that market participants expected some conglomerate
acquisitions to create value by providing opportunities by creating internal capital markets
Following this approach, I examined the acquisition histories of my sample conglomerates to
see which ones participated in acquisitions likely to have created internal capital markets (or
extended existing internal capital markets). I then compared (annual) industry-adjusted q and
profitability ratios for conglomerates with and without internal capital markets, to see if internal-     
15 The NBER Exit List names all firms that exited from the 1991 version of the NBER Manufacturing Sector
Master File, together with the reason for their exit, and the name (and CUSIP, where available) of the acquirer or
successor. 
     
16 Hubbard and Palia (1999) use two indicators for access to external finance: the firm’s dividend payout ratio
and its investment rate. Unfortunately, only a few of my targets had useable data for the investment rate, so I use
only the dividend payout ratio.
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capital-market advantages were the source of the relatively strong conglomerate performance
results reported for the early years of my sample. 
I located acquisition targets for my sample firms using four sources: the NBER Master File
Exit List, provided by Bronwyn Hall
15; the FTC Statistical Report on Mergers and Acquisitions,
1979 (Federal Trade Commission, 1981); the acquisition data from Kaplan and Weisbach (1992);
and an acquisition list provided by Mike Sullivan. From these sources I identified 215 acquisi-
tions made by my 36 conglomerates from 1964 to 1974. Of the 215 targets, 158 had useable data
for measuring access to external finance. Following Hubbard and Palia, I classify a target as
financially constrained if its dividend payout ratio is lower than the median dividend payout ratio
of all targets in the sample, and financially unconstrained otherwise. I use the same technique to
classify the 36 conglomerate bidders in each year.
16 I designate an acquisition as having created
an internal capital market if during the previous year, the bidder is financially constrained and the
target is unconstrained, or the bidder is financially unconstrained and the target is constrained. I
was able to classify 131 acquisitions in this fashion. Of these, 54 created internal capital markets
(or extended existing internal capital markets). I thus classify a conglomerate as having an
internal capital market in a particular year if it participated in at least one internal-capital-market-
generating acquisition prior to that year.
Table 7 reports industry-adjusted values for q and operating profit for conglomerates with
and without internal capital markets. As before, the results are segregated by time period. The
first row shows the industry-adjusted q ratios for all firm-years in the sample (taken from Table20
4). The second row shows industry-adjusted q ratios for only those firm-years following
acquisitions creating internal capital markets. To distinguish the effects of these particular
acquisitions from the effects of acquisitions per se, I also provide industry-adjusted q ratios for
firm-years following other acquisitions. The fourth pair of rows shows the differences between
the values reported in the second and third pairs of rows.
[Table 7 about here]
The results are striking. During the 1966–68 subperiod, the average industry-adjusted q for
conglomerates with at least one prior internal-capital-market-generating acquisition was 0.32,
while the average industry-adjusted q for conglomerates without such acquisitions (but with
other prior acquisitions) was !0.28, a difference of 0.60. (The difference in median q is also
0.60.) During the second subperiod, the average industry-adjusted q ratios are !0.14 and !0.30,
respectively, a difference of 0.16 (the difference in median q is 0.12). During the third subperiod,
the average industry-adjusted q ratios are !0.12 and !0.07, a difference of !0.05 (the difference
in median q is !0.03). Thus during the first subperiod, industry-adjusted q was much higher for
firms with internal capital markets than those without them. During the second subperiod, firms
with internal capital markets were again valued more highly than those without, though the
difference is smaller. During the third subperiod, firms with internal capital markets are not
valued more highly than firms without them.  Moreover, the differences between the first and
second subperiods are driven almost entirely by changes in the value of internal capital markets,
not the value of conglomerates per se. That is, industry-adjusted q varies much less between the
subperiods for acquisitive firms that did not create internal capital markets than for firms that did     
17 The conglomerates continued to make internal-capital-market generating acquisitions throughout the entire
sample period, so these results are not driven by a change in the pattern of acquisitions away from those that
generated internal capital markets. For example, 38% of conglomerate acquisitions prior to 1966 created internal
capital markets; from 1966 to 1968 the figure is 52%; from 1969 to 1971 it is 39%; and from 1972 to 1974 it is
64%. 
     
18 Malkiel (1990, p. 63) attributes conglomerate valuation premiums entirely to investor irrationality. Conglomer-
ate managers, he says, “almost invented a new language in the process of dazzling the investment community. They
talked about market matrices, core technology fulcrums, modular building blocks, and the nucleus theory of growth.
No one from Wall Street really knew what the words meant, but they all got the nice, warm feeling of being in the
technological mainstream.” Conglomerate mergers, he says, were merely a “con game.”
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create them. Firms with internal capital markets were valued at a substantial premium before
1969, and valued at a small discount afterwards.
17
One interpretation of these valuation results is that investors expected internal capital markets
to be efficient during the 1960s, changed their minds at the end of the decade, then revised their
expectations downwards. However, the results cannot be explained entirely by market expecta-
tions of future performance, because industry-adjusted operating profit—a measure of the
efficiency of current operations—is also higher for conglomerates with internal capital markets.
As Table 7 shows, average industry-adjusted operating profit over the three subperiods was
!0.006, !0.004, and !0.011, respectively, for firm-years following acquisitions creating internal
capital markets, and !0.016, !0.014, and !0.016 for firm-years following other acquisitions. Of
course, industry-adjusted operating profit was negative, even for the conglomerates with internal
capital markets, which does not imply superior performance relative to the standalones. Still,
these firms were more efficient (or less inefficient) than conglomerates without internal capital
markets. This suggests that investors’ expectations about the value of internal capital markets
may have been based on real, underlying factors, not misguided beliefs.
18
A problem with these calculations is that they assume that once a firm has made a single
internal-capital-market-generating acquisition, it retains the benefits of internal capital markets in
perpetuity. The results are thus misleading if the effects of these acquisitions diminishes with22
time. As a robustness check, I performed the same exercise, this time focusing only on observa-
tions in the year immediately following an acquisition. The new calculations are reported in the
last three pairs of rows of Table 7. The results are roughly the same as before. In all three
subperiods, firm-years immediately following acquisitions creating internal capital markets have
higher industry-adjusted q ratios than firm-years immediately following other acquisitions, with
the largest difference by far occurring in the 1966–68 subperiod. The results are similar, but
weaker, for operating profit. In short, the basic results hold whether acquisitions creating internal
capital markets are modeled as having a permanent effect the firm’s capital budgeting policy or
only a one-year effect. These may be thought of as upper and lower bounds, so the true effect is
almost certainly similar.
5. Conclusions
The basic finding of this paper is that conglomerate performance, compared with appropriate-
ly defined benchmarks, was better than the conventional wisdom holds. While the conglomerates
were poor performers after 1969, during the late 1960s they performed reasonably well. More
specifically, some firms—what Williamson (1975) calls “appropriately organized conglomer-
ates”—were able to add value by creating internal capital markets. The stock market rewarded
firms creating internal capital markets in the 1960s, but not in the 1970s. This evidence presents
problems for the view that conglomerate diversification is always inefficient and that the
divestitures of the 1980s show the failures of the 1960s.
Why did the value of internal capital markets fall at the end of the 1960s? A common
suggestion is that internal capital markets were always inefficient, but market participants only
learned this over time, as information about poor operating performance was revealed. However,
as seen in Table 7, the relative profitability of internal capital markets was also highest during the     
19 Similarly, corporate refocusing can be explained as a consequence of the rise of takeover by tender offer rather
than proxy contest, the emergence of new financial techniques and instruments like leveraged buy-outs and high-
yield bonds, and the appearance of takeover and breakup specialists like Kohlberg Kravis Roberts which themselves
performed many functions of the conglomerate HQ (Williamson, 1992). A related literature looks at the relative
importance of internal capital markets in developing economies, where external capital markets are limited (Khanna
and Palepu 1999, 2000).
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late 1960s, the period of the valuation premium. Thus the change in conglomerate value over
time cannot be entirely attributed to changes in expectations.
Another possibility is that internal capital markets became less important as the external
capital market became more efficient. The investment community in the 1960s has been
described as a small, close-knit group where competition was minimal and peer influence strong
(Bernstein, 1992). As Bhide (1990) puts it, “internal capital markets 0. 0. 0. may well have
possessed a significant edge because the external markets were not highly developed. In those
days, one’s success on Wall Street reportedly depended far more on personal connections than
analytical prowess.” When capital markets became more competitive in the 1970s, the relative
importance of internal capital markets fell. “This competitive process has resulted in a significant
increase in the ability of our external capital markets to monitor corporate performance and
allocate resources” (Bhide, 1990). As the cost of external finance has fallen, firms have tended to
rely less on internal finance, and thus the value added from internal-capital-market allocation has
fallen.
19
Another possibility is that the potential drawbacks of internal capital markets—divisional
rent seeking, bargaining problems, and bureaucratic rigidity—came to outweigh the advantages,
independent of the efficiency of external capital markets. Unfortunately, without data on internal-
resource-allocation patterns during this period it is difficult to assess this hypothesis. Table 4
does reveal that conglomerates were somewhat more highly leveraged (adjusted for industry)
during the 1966–68 subperiod than the subsequent periods. If leverage reduces agency costs, as
suggested by Jensen (1986), then changes in capital structure could explain the changes in24
internal organizational efficiency. A systematic examination of the conglomerates’ leverage
policies could provide insight here.
Ultimately, these issues are most likely to be settled by in-depth case studies of individual
firms rather than econometric studies. As this paper shows, conclusions drawn from empirical
studies of the conglomerate period are very sensitive to the quality of the underlying segment
data, and the limits of hand collection preclude the use of large datasets. Hopefully complemen-
tary, qualitative evidence can be brought to bear on this phenomenon.25
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Panel A: Size and earnings.
   Sample Conglomerates All Manufacturing Firms
1966–74    1966–74
(n = 283) (n = 17,315)
Total assets Mean $ 1,393.439 $ 306.151
Median 1,033.459 44.896
Net sales Mean $ 1,546.925 $ 340.734
Median 1,275.704 59.407
EBIT Mean $ 126.312  $ 36.899
Median 91.091 5.030
Panel B: Degree of diversification.
     Mean      Standard deviation Minimum   Maximum
Segments per firm-year      5.095      1.689        2          10
Segment sales–weighted Herfindahl      0.293      0.094     0.114       0.698
Figures in Panel A in millions of dollars. EBIT (earnings before interest and taxes) defined as operating income less
depreciation. “All Manufacturing Firms” includes all firms in NBER Master File (described in Hall, 1990).
Segments in Panel B defined at the 4-digit SIC level. 283 firm-years, 1966–74. Herfindahl is the sum of squared
segment sales divided by total sales per firm-year.31
Table 3: Unadjusted Value and Performance Measures 
Total Subperiods
1966–74 1966–68 1969–71 1972–74
Tobin’s q Mean 1.336 2.032 1.242 0.937
Median 1.116 1.498 1.123 0.894
Operating profit Mean 0.128 0.141 0.119 0.129
Median 0.128 0.137 0.118 0.128
Cash flow Mean 0.034 0.038 0.034 0.032
Median 0.031 0.033 0.032 0.030
Leverage Mean 0.260 0.238 0.267 0.268
Median 0.237 0.213 0.252 0.241
Investment Mean 0.067 0.081 0.064 0.062
Median 0.063 0.077 0.059 0.051
n    273 71 102 100
Sample means and medians. Tobin’s q is computed as the market value of common and preferred stock plus the
book value of short- and long-term debt, less the net short-term assets, all divided by the book value of capital stock.
Operating profit is defined as operating income divided by total assets. Cash flow is defined as income available for
common plus depreciation less income taxes paid, all divided by net sales. Leverage is defined as the book value of
long-term debt divided by total assets. Investment is defined as gross investment divided by total assets.32
Table 4: Industry-Adjusted Value and Performance Measures
Panel A: Full period and three subperiods
Total Subperiods
1966–74 1966–68 1969–71 1972–74
Tobin’s q Mean !0.070       0.270       !0.176**   !0.197***
Median !0.083*** !0.077       !0.114*** !0.036***
Operating profit Mean !0.023*** !0.027*** !0.023*** !0.021***
Median !0.021*** !0.024*** !0.020*** !0.021***
Cash flow Mean !0.004*     !0.005       !0.006**   !0.001      
Median !0.003*** !0.003*     !0.003**   !0.002      
Leverage Mean 0.073*** 0.070*** 0.075*** 0.072***
Median 0.054*** 0.046*** 0.060*** 0.060***
Investment Mean !0.001       0.006       !0.002       !0.005      
Median !0.003*     0.001       !0.003       !0.007**  
n    283 72 106 105
Panel B: Subperiod difference tests 
Subperiods
1966–68 1969–71 Difference
Tobin’s q Mean .270       !0.176**   !0.446**  
Median !0.083       !0.114*** !0.051      
Subperiods
1969–71 1972–74 Difference
Tobin’s q Mean !0.176**   !0.197*** !0.021      
Median !0.114*** !0.036**   .078      
Sample means and medians. ***, **, and * indicate the reported value is statistically different from zero at the 1, 5,
and 10% levels, respectively. Industry-adjusted values computed by subtracting from each observation a sales-
weighted average of the median industry values corresponding to each segment-year.33
Table 5: Comparison with Servaes (1996)
Panel A: Servaes (1996)
Adjusted by primary industry only
Adjusted by equally weighted average of
all industries
1967 1970 1973 1967 1970 1973
Mean !0.77*** !0.60*** !0.08       !0.64*** !0.53*** !0.06      
Median !0.11*** !0.18*** !0.02       !0.13**   !0.23*** !0.05*    
Panel B: My data and Servaes’s methods
Adjusted by primary industry only
Adjusted by equally weighted average of
all industries
1966–68 1969–71 1972–74 1966–68 1969–71 1972–74
Mean 0.08        !0.14**    !0.08**   0.02        !0.17***  !0.08**  
Median !0.23**   !0.23*** !0.06*** !0.41*** !0.21*** !0.05***
Panel C: My data and my method
Adjusted by sales-weighted average of all
industries, with control for scale
1966–68 1969–71 1972–74
Mean 0.27       !0.18**   !0.20***
Median !0.08       !0.11*** !0.04***
Industry-adjusted q ratios (sample means and medians) for multiple-segment firms. Panel A reports the results in Servaes
(1996), Table III. Panel C reports my results. Panel B reports industry-adjusted q ratios for my sample conglomerates,
constructed using Servaes’s two methods (primary-industry-weighted segments with no control for segment scale and
equally weighted segments with no control for segment scale, respectively). ***, **, and * indicate the reported value is
statistically different from zero at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.34
Table 6: Regression-Adjusted Measures of Value Added from Diversification
Total Subperiods
1966–72 1966–68 1969–71 1972–74
Conglomerate
dummy 
!0.070   0.046   0.270   0.357* !0.176** !0.012 !0.197*** !0.165***
 (.066)  (.073)  (.222)  (.212)  (.090)  (.077)  (.068)  (.056)
Operating
profit
—   5.947*** —   7.318 —   5.543** —   4.491***
 (1.339)  (5.118)  (2.164)  (1.342)
Leverage —   0.315 —   1.587 — !0.479 —   0.881*
 (.629)  (1.783)  (.791)  (.533)
Constant   1.153***   0.220   3.452***   1.912*   1.355***   0.735**   0.759*** !0.031
 (.279)  (.352)  (.678)  (1.170)  (.053)  (.314)  (.053)  (.202)
R
2   0.379   0.435   0.401   0.432   0.401   0.480   0.492   0.560
n    566    566    144    144    212    212    210    210
Panel regressions of q on profitability, leverage, and a constant. The sample pools conglomerate and matched portfolio
observations into a single panel and adds an indicator variable, “conglomerate dummy,” to distinguish between them. (The
coefficients on the indicator variable in the first, third, fifth, and seventh columns correspond to the industry-adjusted q ratios
reported in Panel A of Table 4.) The models include year-fixed effects and a fixed effect for each conglomerate-portfolio pair.
Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors, adjusted for within-year clustering among the paired observations, are in
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.35
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